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« Rae Langton on Hate Speech | Main | Daniel Dennett on Free Will Worth Wanting »

August 03, 2012

Comments

Munashe the Cheetah

With respect to Patricia Churchland, I did not hear a single successful argument in this podcast that supports the idea that Neuroscience can say anything about morality.

It seems to me that the value of neuroscience is in describing facts to inform philosophers about the way things are, so that they can make up actual arguments for the way things should be. This does not at all say that neuroscience says anything about morality unless when you look at the data provided by neuroscience, you already have presumptions and hidden premises before hand.

Humes point stands, you cannot get an aught from and is.

Anonymous

'It seems to me that the value of neuroscience is in describing facts to inform philosophers about the way things are, so that they can make up actual arguments for the way things should be.'

I wasn't aware that you could 'decribe' a fact,but explain one.Given that neuroscience and the cognate disciplines contribute to a holsitic and or integrative philosophy of mind, in whatever capacity this is in. Even if the purpose (which is what I believe you intially intended to say as opposed to the 'value') was to 'inform' philsophers ,it would not be detrimental to philosophy or science, if this was the case.

I believe philosophers arguments are not included in experimental design.

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